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Professor McWhinney, like Professor Dorsey, was a student of ES.C.
Northrop at Yale Law School in the years immediately following World
War II. Professor Northrop believed that the method of dispute settlement
embodied in the Statute of the International Court of Justice is a product
of Western European culture and that this method is alien to the cultures
of many peoples. Accordingly, Professor Mc Whinney finds, many coun-
tries originally shunned the International Court of Justice. Recently, how-
ever, Third World states, Communist states, and Japan have set aside their
cultural differences and appealed to the Court in instances where their
interests could be served.
WESTERN AND NON-WESTERN LEGAL
CULTURES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE
EDWARD McWHINNEY*
I. DORSEY'S "JURISCULTURE:" THE INTELLECTUAL
DEBTS TO NORTHROP
Gray Dorsey explains his special juridical concept of Jurisculture as
indicating that "philosophies of society and law are to be considered not
as pure idea systems, but as the ordering aspect of instances of organizing
and maintaining human cooperation." 1 While expressly acknowledging
the works of Julian Huxley, Teilhard de Chardin and Monod,2 he calls
for an evolutionary approach to the comparative, historical study of the
processes of establishing and maintaining societies and legal systems as a
basis for developing a new, politically viable World Law.
Dorsey was strongly influenced, as were many of his contemporaries at
the Yale Law School in the immediate post-World War II years, by the
* Queen's Counsel; Professor of International Law and Relations, Simon Fraser University,
Vancouver: Membre de l'Institut de Droit International: Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion; Visiting Professor, School of Law, Meiji University, Tokyo, 1987. The assistance of the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada in the research for the present study is grate-
fully acknowledged.
1. Dorsey, Toward World Perspectives of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 1 ARCHly
FOR RECHTS - UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE, SUPPLEMENTA 3 (1979).
2. Id.
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teachings of Filmer Northrop. Northrop was a philosopher of the sci-
ences who, though without formal legal training, was one of a distin-
guished group of non-legal scholars appointed to the Yale Law School
Faculty during its "Golden Era" of the early 1930s through the 1950s.
Northrop had originally been concerned with analytical logic, and his
early works are in the logic of the sciences and the humanities.3 But his
contact with foreign graduate students and teachers at Yale, an interna-
tional legal center, made him sensitive to the cultural relativism of basic
systems of reasoning and their underlying thought processes. Northrop
pondered whether the particular form of scientific argumentation and
demonstration that Western scientists like Newton and Einstein had de-
veloped was rooted in such a highly particularistic Western society that it
created a threshold of general acculturation that non-Western students
must cross before they can expect to replicate and extend similar scien-
tific theories and experimentations.4 Northrop's interest in cultural an-
thropology and his personal and professional links to Sorokin,
Kluckhohn, Hoebel, and others led him to pose similar questions regard-
ing Western music and the arts. Northrop. asked, for example, whether a
Beethoven symphony is so peculiar to Western civilization in its struc-
ture, organization, and content that it would be inconceivable for it to
have originated in a society other than late 18th and early 19th century
Central Europe.
Northrop's purpose, in posing such questions, was no chauvinistic ven-
ture of vindicating Western values and policies at the expense of other
cultures. Rather, his questions represented an enlightened attempt at
building bridges between the different cultures. These bridges were a
necessary pre-condition to establishing a viable system of World public
order for the post-War era.' Northrop was one of the first Western
thinkers to acknowledge, thereby, the cultural relativism - what we
might today, in latter-day legal parlance, call the "Eurocentrism" - of
dominant theories of international law and organization of the late 1940s
and early 1950s. This cultural relativism reflected the opinions and pol-
icy preferences of the main Western powers of the time.
3. See e.g., NORTHROP, LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES (1947).
4. See eg., Northrop, The Complementary Emphases of Eastern Intuitive and Western Scien-
tific Philosophy, in PHILOSOPHY: EAST AND WEST (Moore, ed., 1944). See generally NORTHROP,
THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST. AN INQUIRY CONCERNING WORLD UNDERSTANDING (1950).
5. Northrop, Naturalistic and Cultural Foundations for a More Effective International Law, 59
YALE LAW JOURNAL 1430 (1950); and Northrop, Contemporary Jurisprudence and International
Law, 61 YALE LAW JOURNAL 623 (1952).
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Northrop's earliest readings introduced him to Ehrlich's concept of
the community "living law." 6 This living law underlay and provided a
necessary corrective for the positive law state authority. Ehrlich had for-
mulated his own theories in the special context of the multi-racial, ethni-
cally-plural Austro-Hungarian Empire, where the Imperial (German)
government, centered in Vienna, laid down its logical constructs in neat,
rational, and uniform Civil Codes. The government then transported
and applied these Codes to all the remote provinces of the far-flung Em-
pire, societies that often differed radically in language, culture, and gen-
eral socio-economic base from the Imperial model of Vienna.
Northrop attempted to apply Ehrlich's lesson to the task of elaborat-
ing and constructing a new, ethno-culturally more representative and in-
clusive, International Law that would supplement those "classical"
doctrines, whose Western roots had been inherited from the pre-War era.
His "The Meeting of East and West" is an ambitious essay examining the
cultural-anthropological roots of basic legal concepts and processes. In
its time, the essay was a necessary first step to synthesizing Western and
non-Western ideas in post-War international law and organization.
Northrop lacked training in foreign and comparative law, which could
have helped him empirically demonstrate how General Principles of In-
ternational Law common to all major cultures are induced from particu-
lar national legal systems' positive law (i.e., national civil codes,
legislation and authoritative court decisions) for reconciling competing
community claims.7 His attempt at a concrete field demonstration in the
special context of the emerging new European Community movement of
the early 1950s, is not wholly persuasive, although it provides intriguing
and valuable inter-cultural, inter-systemic insights.'
II. CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND THE U.S.
WORLD-RULE-OF-LAW CAMPAIGN
Northrop's insistence on the cultural relativism of legal concepts,
processes, and institutions offered an alternative approach for building a
viable system of World public order, to that projected by the U.S. State
6. EHRILICH, GRUNDLEGUNG DER SOZIOLOGIE DES RECHTS (1913).
7. For an ambitious early venture at bi-systemic study and synthesis, see the investigations by
Northrop's student Dorsey in Confucian Chinese, as well as Western, legal norms: Dorsey, Two
Objective Bases for a World-Wide Legal Order, in IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD ORDER
(Northrop, ed.) (1949).
8. NORTHROP, EUROPEAN AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY (1954).
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Department. A group of often highly idealistic special legal advisers,
consultants, and international law professors had clustered around the
U.S. Administration in the immediate post-War years. The original U.S.
"grand design" was sketched out at Yalta and finalized at the San Fran-
cisco conference of the Spring of 1945. The San Francisco Conference
drafted and then adopted the Charter of the United Nations. This Char-
ter projected into the international community a constitutional-legal
model of international organization that drew heavily upon the U.S.
Constitution and upon the U.S.'s unique historical and constitutional
experiences.
The "constitutionalizing" of the post-War system, in this way, was in-
spired by a generous vision of the need to submit international conflicts
to rational and orderly processes of peaceful resolution. This resolution
process is the stuff of the American legal system. Its outlook is not
markedly different from that of the earlier European conceptions ex-
pressed in the two Hague Conferences and resultant Hague Conventions
of 1899 and 1907, and in the League of Nations during the period be-
tween the two World Wars. The institutional and procedural specifics, 9
however, elevated what were no more than examples of highly particu-
laristic, Western (or simply American) constitutional usage to the status
of general, intersystemic, "universal" constitutional norms. In any case,
the Western powers would have to live gracefully with this after they lost
their erstwhile automatic voting majority in the U.N. General Assembly,
with the marked expansion in U.N. membership from 1955 onwards.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, U.S. lawyers at inter-governmental
legal negotiating conferences and at international scientific and profes-
sional-legal reunions began to insist on the inclusion of an express clause
in the various charters they were drafting. The clause would provide for
automatic reference to the International Court of Justice to resolve any
disputes over the interpretations of the terms of an international treaty in
which the U.S. becomes a party. This proposal reflected the emphasis
that American Bar Association committees and the Washington-based
World of Law movement ° gave to international adjudication and to
9. The emphasis, for example, upon a Parliamentary-style U.N. General Assembly, later to be
augmented, in political-legal force and authority, by the U.S.-inspired "Uniting for Peace" gloss
upon the original U.N. Charter text voted by the pro-Western General Assembly majority during
the 1950 Korean War crisis.
10. See generally THE FOUR STEPs AT ATHENS TOWARD WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW
(World Peace through Law Centre, Washington, D.C. (1963)).
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compulsory, third party-based international dispute settlement in gen-
eral. Northrop politely countered this particular form of legal evangel-
ism in support of the International Court. He suggested that judicial
decision-making was an inherently Western approach to dispute settle-
ment and was the product of factors intrinsic to Western legal culture
and experience that were not necessarily replicated in other, non-Western
societies. He might have added that such U.S. public enthusiasm abroad
for the cause of the International Court1 could not be expected to evoke
any matching response in other, non-Western societies. Indeed, these
non-Western societies often viewed the new, post-1946, International
Court of Justice as a mere continuation of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice that existed during the period between the two World
Wars. The only significant difference was the addition of the official U.S.
presence and imprimatur to what had been, pre-War, a form of old West-
ern European "family compact." They therefore saw the new Court as
yet another instrument for maintaining Western political-legal influence
and power in the main post-War international legal arena.
III. CHANGING IMAGES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT: THE
"BLIGHT OF EUROCENTRISM"
In the early post-War era the new International Court of Justice re-
mained, like the old Permanent Court of International Justice, (in terms
of its client-states and, in necessary consequence, its causes) an essen-
tially Western European or Western institution. This was understand-
able in light of some well-recognized historical factors.
Although the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc countries participated in
the general work of the Court by nominating qualified judicial candidates
(who were, then, always elected to the Court) they would not submit
their own cases to the Court. Nor did they offer other states the opportu-
nity of doing so through submission, in advance, to the Compulsory Ju-
risdiction of the Court under the Optional Clause. Old historical-legal
traditions linger on in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, such is the conserva-
tive weight accorded to the old precedents and the old practice of earlier
eras. The Soviet intellectual intransigence in relation to the new Interna-
tional Court probably dates back to Soviet experience with the old Court
11. This enthusiasm was hardly matched, incidentally, at the political level within the U.S.
After World War II the U.S. did not choose to adhere strictly to the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
Court. Rather, the U.S. invoked the Optional Clause of the so-called Connally amendment, adopted
in the U.S. Senate to limit its adherence.
1987]
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in the Eastern Carelia affair of the early 1920s.12 The Soviet attitude is
reinforced by official Soviet awareness of the Soviet and Soviet bloc per-
manent minority voting situation in the new International Court, as in all
the other post-1945 United Nations institutions and agencies.
Political realism is reinforced here by Soviet International law doc-
trines 13 which emphasize that the United Nations Charter is not a Con-
stitution but a limited treaty interpartes. Hence the U.N. Charter is to be
interpreted, not in any broad, Marshallian, "constitutional" spirit, but in
a restrictive, strict constructionist sense. It must be construed against
any claimed exercise of legal power and authority, rather than in its
favor, even in case of ambiguities. The Soviet judges on the new Interna-
tional Court have maintained this position of judicial self-restraint with
impeccable consistency, in the full spirit in which the late Justice Felix
Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court would have approved. Ironi-
cally, they have maintained it despite obvious temptations to ideological
point-taking, to the Soviet advantage, in particular cases.
As for the other main groups of non-Western states, (the Asian, Afri-
can, "Third World" and other states) too many of these were preoccu-
pied, in the immediate post-1945 era, with national self-determination
and independence to be concerned with the refining of the legal processes
of the International Court. The International Court was essentially ig-
nored in favor of other, more politically profitable international arenas.
The U.N. General Assembly became the most interesting of these. Its
numbers expanded and became more representative after the 1955
"package deal" on membership had opened the doors.
The World Rule of Law evangelists in Washington had perhaps failed
to accomplish one of their most obvious, prime duties: enlightening a
new, non-Western state clientele on the new ideas, rampant in the major
U.S. Law Schools, inspired by the Legal Realist movement from the
1930s onwards. These new ideas suggested powerfully that the Rule of
Law need not be another convenient synonym for perpetuating the polit-
ical-legal status qud of yesterday, and that the rdle of the lawyer and of
the judge today consists not merely of mechanically restating the old law
12. Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion of 23 July 1923, P.C.I.J. Series B., No. 5, p.7.
13. As to distinctive Soviet International Law doctrines, with special reference to the U.N.
Charter and the Court, see generally, MCWHINNEY, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND SOVIET-WEST-
ERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 52-71 (1964); CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE. INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND WORLD ORDER IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE 53-70 (1981); UNITED NATIONS LAW MAKING.
CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL RELATIVISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW MAKING FOR AN ERA OF
TRANSITION 55, 58, 84 (1984).
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but also of assuming responsibility for imaginatively up-dating or re-writ-
ing it to correspond with new societal conditions and demands. Lack of
awareness of the potentially dynamic, law-making r6le of the new Inter-
national Court undoubtedly contributed in major measure to a general
lack of interest in the Court in the immediate post-War era. This lack of
interest was reflected in a marked decline in its work-load in comparison
to the old, pre-War, Permanent Court, and also by a notable lack of par-
ticipation, and excitement, in the triennial elections of the Court's judges.
All this was to change dramatically in 1966 with the announcement of
the Court's 8-to-7 decision, South West Africa. Second Phase.4 This de-
cision was rendered only on the second, tie-breaking vote of the Court's
President, the Australian judge, Sir Percy Spender. The case extended
back over a number of years, having been initiated by two African state
plaintiffs, Ethiopia and Liberia. In 1962, they had succeeded in gaining
by an 8-to-7 decision15 a Court ruling allowing them standing to argue
that South Africa's program of Apartheid was incompatible with the old
League of Nations Mandate (now United Nations Trust Territory) of
South West Africa (Namibia). In 1966, the plaintiffs were in effect de-
nied standing to receive judgment. Death, disease, and disablement led
to the premature disappearance of the judges who almost certainly would
have voted the other way. The lack of these judges, plus the rare tie-
breaking vote of the President led to this fortuitous decision.
The Court's 1966 ruling was one that would have baffled the ingenuity
of the Medieval Schoolmen. 16 It also brought a torrent of criticism, in
the U.N. General Assembly and elsewhere, that the Court had given a
politically biased and prejudiced judgment - "a white man's decision,
rendered by a white man's tribunal." Insufficient and incomplete doctri-
nal legal demonstrations in the Court's 1966 judgment combined to pro-
duce a strong reaction to the decision. First, the Court's opinion did not
sufficiently reconcile in strict legal terms the 1966 judgment with the ear-
lier 1962 decision. Second, the Court failed to provide policy justifica-
tions to support the decision, although the dissenting opinions, and
especially the eloquent dissent of the U.S. judge, Philip Jessup 17 , raised
14. South West Africa. Second Phase, Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6 .
15. South West Africa, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 319.
16, Analyzed by MCWHINNEY in THE WORLD COURT AND THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW-MAKING PROCESS 17 (1979); and THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE
WESTERN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (the Paul Martin Lectures) 38-40, 68-72 (1987).
17. I.C.J. Reports 1966, p.6 , at p. 323.
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significant "policy" considerations that urged a more substantial re-
sponse or counter by the Court majority. Third, a new awareness grew
from the unexpected political attention directed to the Court in the first
shock of the 1966 decision, that the Court had a Western or "European"
majority dominant within its ranks at the time. There was, hencefor-
ward, a new political sophistication and attention to the regular elections
of the Court judges; and this brought, in its turn, a new interest in judi-
cial philosophy and competing theories of law and the legal process.
More attention was paid to the legal values and value-preferences of can-
didates for judicial election. Finally, an increasing formalization and
"regionalization" of the business of selection and allocation of judicial
seats on the Court paralleled developments in electoral practice in other
main United Nations arenas such as the Security Council, General As-
sembly, and International Law Commission.
The changes that all this produced in the Court were necessarily incre-
mental, in view of the "staggered" system of elections to the Court. Only
a third of the members of the Court retire or present themselves for re-
election at the regular, three year intervals. In the long-run, in fact, no
revolution occurred in the ettno-cultural composition or political-ideo-
logical make-up of the Court. The shift was one of degree only, and a
modest shift at that. But it was symbolically important, and brought a
new understanding on the part of both non-Western and Western states
of the potentialities for changing International Law inherent in the
Court's r6le. The possibility of change was especially promising if the
Court invoked the more creative, policy-oriented, approaches dominant
in post-War Western legal science and Western Law Schools. 18 As a re-
sult of the changes, Third World states gained more confidence in the
Court, manifested in the early 1980s by Third World states bringing
cases before the Court, filling the erstwhile alarming gaps in the Court's
docket.
By the same token, however, the Western states that had been near
exclusive clients of the Court in the first several decades of the post-War
era, began to doubt for political reasons the merits of judicial decision-
making and judicial settlement of international disputes. These states
18. Manifested in the Court's own volte face, only five years after South West Africa. Second
Phase of 1966, and this by overwhelming judicial majorities, in the Namibia Advisory Opinion ruling
in 1971: Legal Consequences of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1971, p.1 6.
[Vol. 65:873
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss4/18
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
were reacting - in retrospect, it is clear, over-reacting - to what was
often described in language startlingly reminiscent of some of the criti-
cisms of the "New Deal" Roosevelt appointments to the United States
Supreme Court, as a "politicisation" of the processes of selection of In-
ternational Court judges. In fact, only one judicial seat seems to have
been influenced, in the voting result, by Third World back-lash against
the South West Africa Second Phase decision of 1966: the defeat of the
distinguished Australian, U.N.-jurist, Sir Kenneth Bailey. Bailey was a
candidate in late 1966 to succeed his fellow-countryman President
Spender who had cast the decisive second, tie-breaking vote in that deci-
sion. But the succession to Spender's seat remained within its own spe-
cial, customarily-sanctioned "region," as an English-language, Common
Law, British Commonwealth seat. The successful candidate was an emi-
nently well-qualified Nigerian jurist who also met all the relevant "re-
gional" criteria.
The dissatisfaction of older Western European states was manifested,
in the criticisms, sotto voce, in various Western European Foreign Minis-
tries at the Special Opinions filed by non-Western European judges in
North Sea Continental Shelf in 1969.19 This case was itself a Western
European "family compact" type of dispute, (wholly intra-European
Community, in fact) of the sort that used to be heard by the older Perma-
nent Court in the era between the two Wars. The ultimate disillusion-
ment in the Court by a Western state, however, was expressed by the
United States Administration in the reaction to the various decisions -
the preliminary, the jurisdictional, and the substantive - in Nicaragua v.
United States.20 In this case the U.S. complained that the Court was
rendering "political" and not "legal" decisions.21 The U.S. State Depart-
ment contended that the Court membership included judges to whom
"highly sensitive intelligence" factual material (which the U.S. consid-
ered to be relevant to the U.S. case) could not be confided with trust.2
Strangely these complaints came from American jurists in the wake of
more than half a century American Legal Realist teachings. The U.S.
invoked the complaints as justification of its decision to withdraw from
19. North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3 .
20. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Provisional Measures, Order of 10 May 1984, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p.169; Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p.392; Merits, Judgment, I.CJ. Reports 1986, p. 14 .
21. The International Court of Justice and the Western Tradition of International Law (1987),
p.111-117.
22. Id. at 120-123.
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
882 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
any further participation in Nicaragua v. United States while the Court
was still hearing it, and henceforward to terminate U.S. acceptance of the
Court's Compulsory Jurisdiction. In its new general policy of retreat
from the Court, the U.S. Administration announced that it would eschew
the full Bench of the court altogether, and use, instead, only five-member
Special Chambers whose composition, according to the view of the Ad-
ministration, it could control.
23
Actually, such complaints against the Court in Nicaragua and the im-
plications of an anti-U.S., anti-Western bias ignore the obvious fact that
the Court judgments in Nicaragua on the main substantive points, were
all rendered by a 12-to-3 vote, with substantial representation of Western
and Western-learning judges in the majorities.
IV. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
A recent debate in Tokyo on the occasion of a French-Japanese Cul-
tural Summit Reunion 4 throws into relief some of the central problems
today for an institution - the International Court of Justice - and a
process - the judicial settlement of disputes, and consequential judicial
law-making - whose cultural-legal origins are unmistakably Western
and whose main political-legal impulse, after 1945, was inspired by the
U.S.
As is well known, Imperial Japan, during the Meii era beginning in
1868, consciously decided, as act-of-will and act-of-state, to "receive"
Western institutions, processes and principles, including law. After ex-
perimentation at various levels, including researches in the highest aca-
demic and University institutes, with various alternative Western legal
models, principally French and German, the Japanese decided to opt in
1889 for an Imperial Constitution modelled after the German Rechts-
staat; and also, just before the end of the century and even before its
official proclamation in Germany, for "reception" of the new German
Civil Code (Btirgerliches Gesetzbuch) of 1900.
23. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Main Area, Constitution of Cham-
ber, Order of 20 January 1982, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p.3: discussed in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE AND THE WESTERN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987), pp.8 9 -9 3 .
24. Occidentalisation et Japonisation, in L'AVENIR DE LA CULTURE: SOMMET CULTUREL
FRANCO-JAPONAIS 39-61 (1984). See, e.g., the echoes (unconsciously) of Filmer Northrop's earlier
propositions on cultural particularism and distinctive national systems of reasoning and analysis,
differentiating European and Asian approaches to the sciences. Kato Shuichi:, id. at 55-6.
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In the domain of International Law, after the inauguration of the Meyi
era (1868-1912) and during the succeeding Taisho era (1912-26), there
was a similar "reception" of Western law. That movement emphasized
learning, faithfully, the positive law rules and theories of "classical"
Western-based international law, and then simply applying them to ac-
tual events, as they arose, in international society. Really only after the
beginning of the Showa era in 1926, did Japanese international law stud-
ies become established as a systematic juridical science in their own right,
with a firm methodological foundation. 25 This was the result, princi-
pally, of the work of two very great scholars, Kisaburo Yokota and
Ryoichi Taoka. Together, they built the scholastic foundation of modern
international law studies in Japan, applying a precise positivist methodol-
ogy based upon detailed historical analysis. Their approach is identified
as historical positivism, although it bears obvious analogies to the
method that Cardozo proposed for internal national law testing. More-
over, there are clear links to the first stages at least of that sociological
inquiry in aid of law-making that is part of American sociological juris-
prudence. The method employed by Yokota and Taoka emphasized
clarifying the socio-historical circumstances in which a claimed existing
norm of international law had been first formed. This clarification pro-
cess was based on the premise that it was necessary to analyze the origi-
nal social function of the norm in question and the limitation implied
thereby on its practical operation.26
Yokota traced the history of Japanese attitudes regarding international
adjudication.27 He found them to be originally, if briefly, highly sympa-
thetic, reflecting the enlightened Western European and general Western
liberal internationalist thinking in international law that was to
culminate, at the close of the 19th century, in the establishment of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration. During the period between the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904-5 and World War II, however, Yokota found Jap-
anese attitudes regarding international adjudication to be "negative, eva-
sive and even antagonistic."28 This negative attitude was a direct result
of Japan's unhappy experience with the Permanent Court of Arbitration
25. Tabata, The Late Professor Ryoichi Taoka. His Contributions to the Study of International
Law, 23 JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1985).
26. Id.
27. Yokota, InternationalAdjudication and Japan, 17 JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1 (1973).
28. Id.
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and its decision of May 22, 1905, rendered in the so-called House Tax
case.29 Yokota was intellectually honest enough to acknowledge that the
"marked tendency toward militarism appear[ing] since the Russo-Japa-
nese War" was hostile to the idea of international adjudication, since it
promoted opinion favoring the settlement of international disputes not by
peaceful methods but by force.30 Such a tendency toward force was not
limited to Japanese society. Rather, it also existed in Western Europe at
the same time. Perhaps this attitude reflected a general impatience with
"classical" International Law. "Classical" International Law was viewed
as consecrating the political-legal status quo and establishing well-nigh
inoperable institutional and procedural obstacles to the status quo's
peaceful change so as to reflect new societal conditions in the World
Community. Yokota and other Japanese jurists of his generation and
general intellectual persuasion agreed, however, that World War II, in its
cataclysmic break with the immediate historical past, through the ago-
nies of military defeat and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Naga-
saki, brought a complete about-face in Japanese attitudes to international
adjudication. This radical change was evidenced by Japan's acceptance of
the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court under the Op-
tional Clause in 1958 without substantial reservations. Thus, Japan has
now become the "most advanced in the field of international adjudica-
tion, being ready to submit unconditionally all legal disputes to the
I.C.J. ' ' 31
This raises the question of the extent to which the new, post-World
War II Japanese attitudes about the World Court and about interna-
tional adjudication in general, reflect Japanese legal culture generally to-
day or, in Ehrlich's terms as adopted by Northrop and applied to the
international legal society, reflect contemporary (post-1945) Japanese
community "living law." Perhaps, in contrast, the new attitudes simply
project a highly sophisticated and intellectually eclectic Japanese legal
dlite which has "received" and itself adopted Western legal ideas on in-
ternational law, much as the Imperial bureaucratic-legal dite "received"
German constitutional law and then German Civil Law, by Imperial fiat,
in the Meii era. The answer to the question is important because it helps
determine the intensity and durability, in key non-Western societies, of
29. This case involved the Japanese government's levying of taxes on the houses of foreigners
living in the foreign concessions in Yokohama and Kobe.
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id. at 15.
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the originally Western World Rule-of-Law concepts, as translated into
the notion of an International Court-based system of peaceful settlement
and conflicts resolution - this at a particular moment in history when
some key Western societies, and most notably the United States under
the Reagan Administration, are signalling their disenchantment with the
Court and their retreat from the principle of international adjudication in
general.
V. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE "LIVING LAW" IN THE
GENERAL "RECEPTION" AND DIFFUSION OF WESTERN
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND IDEAS
The French-Japanese Cultural Summit of 1984, already referred to,
picked up the concept of "Oecidentalization." Its main protagonists had
little difficulty in equating the concept in its particular space-time dimen-
sion, at the outset of the Meiji era, with "modernization." 32 The passage
to Western law -in its substantive principles and also in its key institu-
tions and processes - signified and also actively promoted the transition
to a Western-style industrial society. Along with this transition came
competition with its manufactured goods in World markets and, as the
barriers to international trade were raised between the two World Wars,
being drawn into conflict in pursuit of scarce raw materials and new out-
lets for industrial goods and services.
The alternative to an "Oecidentalization" of Japanese culture in the
continuing pursuit of the Modernization goal in the post-industrial soci-
ety of today has been the new concept of "Japanization" which, with the
threat of new forms of international economic Protectionism and the evi-
dent decline of the U.S. dollar and the U.S. trading position generally,
may suggest a break with the key concepts of Japanese foreign and do-
mestic policy since the inauguration of the new, U.S.-style constitution of
1946: a close political-military association with the U.S. and NATO
countries in spite of, and compatibly with, Article 9 ("renunciation of
War") constitutional imperatives of the 1946 Constitution; a constitu-
tional governmental system modelled, since 1946, on that of the United
States and involving a massive "reception" of U.S. constitutional institu-
tions, processes, and substantive ideas in direct replacement of the "re-
ceived" German Rechtsstaat constitution of 1889; and close integration
with the U.S. monetary and trading system.
32. Oe Kensaburo, Occidentaflsation et Japonisation, supra note 24 at 43.
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The current Japanese national judge on the International Court, U.S.-
trained himself, was one of three dissenters (including the U.S. national
judge) to the Court's 12-to-3 decision against the U.S. Government in
Nicaragua v. United States.33 Judge Oda's Dissenting Opinion, in its par-
ticular mode of reasoning and argumentation, embraces what, by now,
has become a "classical" form of judicial self-restraint. This mode of
judicial self-restraint was last substantially reproduced by Judge Fitz-
maurice in his pained dissent in Namibia 34 to the Court's lop-sided ma-
jority reversal of the 1966 case, South West Africa. Second Phase.3" The
opinion could well have been written by a judge with a wholly Western
legal culture embracing the particular logico-formal rationality that Max
Weber thought was.the apogee of Western legal development. Not sur-
prisingly, perhaps, Judge Oda is joined in dissent by the British national
judge, Sir Robert Jennings, 36 who writes a neo-positivist, technical legal
opinion that avoids the substantive-law involvements (and perhaps the
temptation to enter into the substantive-political merits of the case). The
U.S. national judge37 provides the remaining judicial dissent in Nicara-
gua v. United States.
Judge Oda offers an intellectually self-consistent and well-reasoned
legal argument in support of his dissenting vote in Nicaragua. If the
discourse is intrinsically Western legal positivism, it suggests that this
particular Western law approach has already entered into Japanese legal
discourse and become part of general Japanese legal culture. It was, after
all, Judge Oda's distinguished predecessor, Judge Kotaro Tanaka, who
made a point of defending the Court of the immediate post-South West
Africa. Second Phase, 1966, period against charges of political bias.38 In
reaffirming his own neo-positivist conception that the "essence" of the
Court's function is "legal and not political disputes, ' 39 Judge Tanaka
substantially echoed thepre-Legal Realist, Western positivist proposition
of an absolute dichotomy between Law and Politics.'
33. I.CJ. Reports 1986, p.14 , at p.212 (dissenting opinion of Oda J.).
34. I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16, at p. 303 (dissenting opinion of Fitzmauride J.).
35. I.C.J. Reports 1966, p.6 .
36. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p.14, at p.528 (dissenting opinion of Jennings, J.).
37. Id. at 259 (dissenting opinion of Schwebel J.).
38. Tanaka, The Character of World Law in the International Court of Justice, 15 JAPANESE
ANNUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 2-3 (1971).
39. Id. at 7-8.
40. See also in this context, the late distinguished jurist, Takeshi Minagawa, who (acknowledg-
ing the influence of the "classical" British jurist, J.L. Brierly), insisted that the International Court's
"traditional modality of existence and functioning must be maintained and should be protected from
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It may thus be possible to conclude that the Japanese "special legal
community" has become sufficiently acculturated in basic Western (and
U.S.) legal institutions such as judicial review (and the incidental pos-
sibilities and also the prudent limits of judicial policy-making), to make
legal positivism not merely a "received" Western legal idea that a West-
ern-trained Japanese national legal 6lite has taken up as a somewhat arti-
ficial intellectual-legal construct. Rather, by now legal positivism is a
part of intrinsically Japanese legal thought-ways and processes that the
general Japanese legal community (in the Universities, the civil service
bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the practicing profession) has compre-
hended, accepted, and actively applied.
The Egyptian jurist, Boutros-Ghali,'" identifies an artificiality in the
ideology of the 1946 Arab legal lite that favored a Western-style "rule of
Law." He observed that "those ruling elites were impregnated with
Western constitutionalism and believed that inter-Arab conflicts could be
settled by an international judge,"'42 rather than by the more pragmatic
forms of political accommodation common to pre-Westernized Arab
legal history. Such strictures would seem to apply to most properly, and
to be limited to pre-democratic societies like the Arab states at the end of
the War in 1945 and even to Egypt itself, which had then only recently
become free from Imperial (British) political suzerainty. For those non-
Western states that have successfully broken with an Imperial, Western
past, the process of "reception" of foreign, Western laws (national and
international), once imposed by dictate of Empire, can evolve into a vol-
untary, consensual acceptance. That is, it can involve a continuing crea-
tive developing of the original foreign law. The "receiving" society may
thus give its own distinctive stamp to the "received" law, so that "re-
ceived" law takes on its own independent character and personality in
the new state. It may sometimes - as with the "reception" of U.S. con-
various pressures and challenges"; that "the task for the Court is to adjudicate in accordance with
law (secundum jus), .... that it cannot direct the adjustment of interests based upon the considera-
tions, not of law, but of political expediency,' that its task is to interpret and apply, but not to create
and modify, law." Discussed in Sato, Review of Professor Takeshi Minagawa's KOKUSAIHO
KENKYU with Some General Observations on his Contribution to the Science of International Law, 15
HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLITICS 13, 25-26 (1987).
41. Boutros-Ghali, The Arab League 1945-1970, 25 REvuE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL 67 (1969).
42. Id. at 81. See also Ofosu-Amaah, Regional Enforcement of International Obligations, 47
ZEITSCHRIFT F0R AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECT 80, 84 (1987).
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stitutional ideas in Europe and Asia after 1945 - seem to become even
more modem and functionally effective than its original model.
The Indian jurist, Anand,43 responding to the current phenomenon of
the legal Global Village and the increasing homogenization of an interna-
tional legal lite through common exposure to education in the same
World legal centers and by the same teachers, suggests - correctly I
believe - that Western jurists may underestimate the capacities for im-
aginative assimilation, and for creative re-working in accord with new
societal needs, of old, "classical," Western-derived legal concepts and
ideas. 4 Perhaps Western jurists are even unconsciously irritated that the
"received," originally Western, legal ideas are not immediately rejected
after de-Colonization and Independence, but are, instead, re-thought and
re-made in accord with those post-Colonial societies' conceptions of their
own national interest.45 Julius Stone remarked sagely, in this context,
that national interest, conventionally defined and applied,46 would in-
creasingly replace a priori, ethno-culturally based considerations in the
development of distinctive national International Law policy positions.
These are the significant legal cross-currents of our times, countering
the threatened fragmentation of "classical" International Law through
its dispersal into a congeries of separate, "regional," ethno-culturally
based, particularist legal systems. These currents also suggest that the
principle of international adjudication has, by now, acquired its own sub-
stantial non-Western legal base and support, in significant non-Western
legal cultures. This support has reached the point where the principle of
international adjudication is likely to survive politically any self-imposed
retreat, temporary or long-range as the case may be, adopted by the U.S.
Administration or other Western states in the first unhappy reaction to
the International Court's ruling in Nicaragua v. United States.4 7
The community "living law," identified by Ehrlich in municipal, na-
43. Anand, Attitude of the New' Asian-African Countries Towards the International Court of
Justice, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 53 (1969); Anand, Role of International Adju-
dication, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 4 (Gross, ed. 1976).
44. Mentioning, in particular, Filmer Northrop, C.W. Jenks, Quincy Wright, and B.V.A. RoI-
ing; ANAND, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 6 (Gross, ed. 1976).
45. Cf. Boutros-Ghali, as cited by Shihata, The Attitude ofthe New States Towards the Interna-
tional Court ofJustice, 19 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 39 (1961).
46. Stone, A Common Lawfor Mankind?, 1 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (New Delhi) 430 (1955-
6); Lissitzyn, International Law in a Divided World, 542 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 37
(1963); FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 302 (1964).
47. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14 .
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tional legal terms and transposed by Northrop to the World Community,
is thus not to be conceived as a purely static sociological condition, fixed
once and for all, in societal terms but as capable of continuing evolution
in historical terms. "Received" foreign legal concepts, institutions, and
processes, are capable - provided that the "receiving" legal dlite is intel-
lectually flexible and pragmatic, and provided that the "receiving" soci-
ety is itself in continuing political, social, and economic development -
of taking on an independent life of their own, the "received" positive law
continually interacting with the society and shaping, in its turn, new soci-
etal attitudes and expectations in regard to the positive law for the future.
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